The 50th NC Regiment (State Troops) was organized April 15, 1862, at Camp Mangum, near Raleigh, composed of the following companies:

Company A—Person County—Captain John C. Van Hook.
Company B—Robeson County—Captain E. C. Adkinson.
Company C—Johnston County—Captain Robert D. Lunceford.
Company D—Johnston County—Captain Henry J. Ryals.
Company E—Wayne County—Captain John B. Griswold.
Company F—Moore County—Captain James A. O. Kelly.
Company G—Rutherford County—Captain George W. Andrews.
Company H—Harnett County—Captain Joseph H. Atkinson.
Company I—Rutherford County—Captain John B.Eaves.
Company K—Rutherford County—Captain Samuel Wilkins.

Marshall D. Craton, of Wayne County, was elected Colonel; James A. Washington, of Wayne County, Lieutenant Colonel; George Wortham, of Granville County, Major; Dr. Walter Duffy, of Rutherford County, was appointed Surgeon; Edwin B. Borden, of Wayne County, Quartermaster; Edward S. Parker, of Wayne County, Commissary; William H. Borden, of Wayne County, Adjutant; Jesse W. Edmundson, of Wayne County, Sergeant Major; Dr. Robert S. Moran, Chaplain.

The six (6) weeks following the organization of the regiment were spent at Camp Mangum, and we were subjected to almost constant drilling from morning till night. There was not, during this time, a single musket in the regiment, but as a substitute we were armed with what was then known as the "Confederate Pike.'' This formidable implement of war consisted of a wooden handle about ten (10) feet long, at one end of which a dirk-shaped spear was securely fastened, and attached to this spear at the shank, or socket, was another steel blade in the form of a brier hook in order, as the boys said, that they could get them "a-going and a-coming." These were not very well adapted for practice in the manual of arms, but at the end of the six (6) weeks the regiment was remarkably well drilled, considering all the circumstances. On May 31st, we were ordered to Garysburg, near Weldon, where the same routine of daily and almost hourly drill was kept up until June 19th, when we were ordered to Petersburg, VA, and went into camp at Dunn's Hill, near the city. In a short while we were moved from here to Pickett's Factory, on Swift Creek, where we remained until June 26th, on which date we were ordered to Drewry's Bluff, on the James River, below Richmond.

We were now organized into a brigade composed of the 32nd, 43rd, 45th, 50th, and 53rd NC Regiments, and 2nd NC Battalion, with Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel in command of the brigade.

IN FRONT OF RICHMOND, 1862.

On Sunday, June 20th, we were made to realize for the first time that we were actually a part of the great Confederate Army, when we received orders to prepare at once for a forced march to reinforce our troops who had already been fighting for several days in succession around Richmond. Taking the 43rd, 45th, and 50th NC Regiments and Brem's (later Graham's) Battery, Brig. Gen. Daniel crossed the James River on a pontoon bridge, and after a hard day's march over almost impassable roads, we reached a point near the two (2) contending armies and camp for the night. About daybreak on the morning of June 30th, we resumed the march. Just at sunrise, and immediately in our front, at a short distance, a balloon sent up by the enemy for the purpose of locating our lines and discovering the movements of our troops, made its appearance above the treetops. Our line was immediately halted and a battery quickly gotten into position, opened fire on the balloon, which rapidly descended and passed from view. We resumed the march, but being thus timely warned, changed our course. We are soon joined by Brig. Gen. John G. Walker's (TX) Brigade, moving on a different road, and together reached New Market at an early hour. At this place we were joined by Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise (VA), with the 26th and 46th VA Regiments, and two light batteries, he having left Chafiin's Bluff soon after Col. Junius Daniel's (NC) Brigade left Drewry's Bluff, for the purpose, as he states in his official report, of supporting Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (NC) at his urgent request.

The aforementioned troops, together with a squadron of cavalry under command of Major Burroughs, constituted the command of Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (NC), which, early on the morning of June 30th, took position near New Market on the extreme right of the Confederate line. We remained in this position for several hours, when we received orders to move down the River Road to support some batteries in charge of Col. James Deshler, which had been placed in position in a thick wood near the River Road between Malvern Hill and the James River. The three (3) regiments of Col. Daniel's Brigade took position in rear of Col. Deshler's Battery with the 45th NC Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. John H. Morehead, on the right; the 50th NC Regiment, commanded by Col. Marshall D. Craton, in the center; the 43rd NC Regiment, commanded by Col. Thomas S. Kenan, on the left. The right of the 45th NC Regiment rested a little beyond where the roads forked, and was partially protected by the woods; the 43rd NC Regiment had the slight protection afforded by woods on both sides of the road; the 50th NC Regiment occupied the open space made by clearings on both sides of the road at this point. About the time the formation of our lines in the road was completed, we were startled by the explosion of a single shell just over our heads, as if dropped from the skies above.

We could form no idea whence it came, but were not long kept in doubt, for in a few minutes there was a perfect shower of shells of tremendous proportion and hideous sound hurled from the heavy naval guns of the Federal fleet on the James River, just opposite and about 900 yards distant, with a perfectly open field intervening. The scene was awe-inspiring, especially to raw troops who were under fire for the first time. Such a baptism of fire for troops not actually engaged in battle has very rarely been experienced in the history of war. There was a slight depression in the roadway, and across the open space occupied by the 50th NC Regiment was a plank fence. We were ordered to lie down behind this for such protection as it and the embankment on the road side might afford. About this time a squadron of cavalry, which was drawn up in line on the right of the road and just opposite the position occupied by the 50th NC Regiment, was stampeded by the explosion of a shell in their ranks, and in their wild flight rushed their horses against the plank fence which, like a dead-fall, caught many of our men who were held down to be trampled by the horses, until we could throw down the rail fence on the opposite side of the road and allow them to escape, which they were not slow to do.

In the confusion incident to this affair, and the effort of the men to escape injury from the wild horses, the color bearer of the 50th NC Regiment escaped to the open field to the right of the road and planted the colors in full view of the fleet on the river, thereby concentrating their fire on our part of the line. It was some time before he was noticed standing solitary and alone in the open field, grasping his flag staff, which was firmly planted in the ground, as if bidding defiance to the whole Union Army and navy, and the rest of mankind. As soon as order had been restored, Col. Deshler was notified that the infantry support was in position, and he was instructed to open fire on the enemy's lines, which were now occupying Malvern Hill. This served to divert a portion of the fire of the gunboats from our part of the line, but at the same time drew upon us the fire of the enemy's batteries on Malvern Hill at short range with grape and canister, together with solid shot and shell. We were now under a heavy crossfire, with no protection from the fire of these batteries. The Confederate batteries in our front under command of Col. Deshler, were suffering terribly, and although many of the men were either killed or disabled by wounds, and most of the horses lost, they never wavered, but stood by their guns and served them to the close of the fight.

As the fire from Malvern Hill continued to increase, new batteries being constantly added, Maj. Gen. Holmes requested Col. Daniel to send forward the guns of Brem's Battery to reinforce Col. Deshler. A short while after these passed to the front. Col. Daniel received an order from Maj. Gen. Holmes to advance a portion of his infantry to their support. The 45th and 50th NC Regiments promptly moved forward in column down the road, but had proceeded only a short distance when we were met by Brem's Battery in wild flight, dashing through our ranks, knocking down, and running over many of our men with their horses and guns. About this time the Federals posted a battery on our right flank at short range. As it was impossible to withstand this flank fire, we were ordered to leave the road and take position under cover of the woods on the right. The writer remained in the road, but took advantage of such protection as was afforded by an oak gate post about eighteen (18) inches square standing on the right of the road. I had been here but a short while when Col. Daniel came riding slowly along the line, speaking to and encouraging the men, his horse bleeding profusely from a wound just received. There was a perfect shower of shot and shell along the road all the while, but as he reached a point opposite where I was standing, a shell from the gunboats exploded just above the road, and I saw him fall from his horse.

He was soon able to rise and walk to the gate post, where he remained until he recovered from the shock, after which he walked to the rear, secured another horse, and returning to where I was ordered me to go across the road, form my company, which was the color company of the regiment, march it to our former position on the road and have the regiment form on it. We were all soon back in our first position on the road, where we remained until about 10 o'clock that night, when we were marched back up the road to a piece of woods and camped for the night. On the following day, July 1st, we took position near that of the day before, and remained in line of battle during the day and all night. For six (6) days in succession the Confederates had been successful in battle, and the Federal army, under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, was whipped, demoralized and in full retreat, hoping almost against hope, that they might by some chance reach cover of their gunboats on the James River. The battle of Malvern Hill, the last of the Seven Days' Battles, proved disastrous to the Confederates. There was a fearful sacrifice of life and all for naught, as on the following morning, July 2nd, we stood for hours and watched the Federal column moving along the roads to their haven of safety under cover of their gunboats at Harrison's Landing, and we were powerless to interpose any obstacle.

Without presuming to criticise the conduct of this battle, or fix the responsibility for failure to capture Maj. Gen. McClellan's entire army, a result which at this time seemed almost absolutely certain, I will simply recall the fact that as early as the night of June 29th, and all day of the 30th, Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (NC) was within a short distance of the naturally strong position of Malvern Hill with more than 6,000 troops, and could easily have occupied this position. During the day of June 30th, Brig. Gen. Fitz J. Porter, of the Federal army, took advantage of this opportunity to occupy and fortify these heights, and thereby cover the retreat and make possible the escape of Maj. Gen. McClellan's army, while the 6,000 troops under Maj. Gen. Holmes for two (2) days and nights served no other purpose than to furnish targets for the Federal gunboats and batteries.

On July 2nd, we commenced the march back to our former camp at Drewry's Bluff, reacliing there about 8 o'clock the next morning.

On July 6th, we were ordered to Petersburg, where for several weeks we were employed in constructing breastworks around the city and doing picket duty along the river.

HARRISON'S LANDING.

On July 31st, just one month after the battle of Malvern Hill, the infantry brigades of Col. Van H. Manning and Col. Junius Daniel, and the artillery brought over by Brig. Gen. William N. Pendleton (VA), consisting of forty-three (43) pieces, together with the light batteries belonging to Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill's (NC) command, making seventy (70) pieces in all, left Petersburg on a secret mission. In order to conceal the real design, the report had been freely circulated that it was a demonstration against Suffolk. We left Petersburg at 7 o'clock a.m., marched seven (7) miles and were halted at Perkinson's Mill, where rations were issued to the men. Late in the afternoon we resumed the march, having received orders that all canteens or anything that was calculated to make unnecessary noise, should be discarded, and that no one should speak above a whisper under penalty of death. The night was intensely dark, as a heavy thunder storm prevailed.

This caused much trouble and consequent delay on the part of the artillery, which was following in our rear. About midnight Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Hill (NC), with the infantry brigades of Col. Manning and Col. Daniel, reached Merchant's Hope Church. In a short while Brig. Gen. Pendleton arrived and reported to Maj. Gen. Hill that it would be impossible to get his guns in position in time to make the attack that night, as had been contemplated and planned. Maj. Gen. Hill expressed great disappointment and fear that the expedition would prove a failure, as our troops would undoubtedly be discovered the next day. He turned over the command to Brig. Gen. Samuel G. French (MS) and returned to Petersburg that night. The infantry moved back from the road in a thick wood just opposite the church, where they remained concealed the balance of the night, all of the next day and until midnight of August 1st. About the time we reached our position on the night of July 31st, the rain, which had been threatening during the fore part of the night, broke loose in a perfect torrent, thoroughly flooding the flat, swampy ground upon which we were compelled to lie until midnight of August 1st.

This day, August 1st, was the date set apart by the State authorities of North Carolina for the casting of the soldier vote in the State election, which was then held on the first Thursday in August. We, therefore, had the novel experience of conducting an important and exciting election while lying flat on the ground in mud and water, and "no one allowed to move or speak under penalty of death." It is needless to state that Colonel Zebulon B. Vance, who was recognized as the soldiers' candidate for Governor, received an overwhelming majority of the vote cast. The writer, who was then eighteen (18) years of age, had the pleasure of casting his first political vote for this favorite son of the Old North State. For fear that some member of Congress, over zealous for the maintenance of "the purity of the ballot," may introduce a "joint resolution" to inquire into the legality of this election, I will state that in the army "age" was not one of the qualifications inquired into, but the carrying of a musket or sword was considered all-sufficient.

After it had been decided that it was impracticable to make the attack on the night of July 31st, Brig. Gen. Pendleton gave orders to his subordinate officers to take such steps as would effectually conceal their guns and horses from the observation of the enemy when they sent up their balloon next morning, which was their custom each morning as soon as it was light enough to see distinctly. They had barely completed this task when the balloon was seen slowly ascending, but fortunately they were not discovered. Each commander of a battery had certain specific work assigned him by Brig. Gen. Pendleton, and they spent the entire day in selecting locations and routes by which they could reach the same the following night. They also took advantage of the day time, when everything was in full view, to range stakes by which to direct their fire at night. The long range guns were directed on Maj. Gen. McClellan's camp across the river, and the short range on the shipping on the river. The plan was to make the attack precisely at midnight, but it was 12:30 before everything was in readiness. Forty-three (43) of the seventy (70) guns had been placed in position on the bank of the river, some of them at the very water's edge. The other guns were not considered of sufficient range, and were, therefore, not brought into action. By 12 o'clock the infantry had been quietly formed, moved across the road, and drawn up in line between the church and the river, in rear of our guns.

We were held in suspense for half an hour when the expected "signal" gun was fired. Immediately and simulltaneously the forty-three (43) guns were discharged. Each of the guns had been supplied with from twenty to thirty (20-30) rounds, with instructions to fire these as rapidly as possible, hitch up and retire. The noise and the flashes of light produced by the rapid and continuous fire of these guns in the dead of a dark, still night, immediately on the water front of the river, was awe-inspiring in the extreme, and the consternation produced among the shipping on the river and in the camp beyond was indescribable. In less than ten (10) minutes many of the vessels were sinking and many others were seriously damaged.

In a few minutes after we opened fire several gunboats, which were up the river on the lookout for the Confederate "Merrimac" No. 2, which they were momentarily expecting to come down the river, and which were constantly kept under a full head of steam and prepared for instant action, steamed past our position at a rapid rate of speed, raking the banks of the river with their fire, but not halting to engage our batteries in fair action. Our only casualties were one (1) man killed and two (2) wounded by the explosion of a shell at one of the batteries served by Captain Dabney. The damage inflicted on the enemy will perhaps never be known. Federal Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, in his first report to Washington next morning, states his only damage to be one (1) man slightly wounded in the leg, but in a later report the same day, admits the loss of ten (10) men killed and twelve (12) wounded, and a number of horses killed; but he strangely omits any reference to the damage inflicted on the shipping on the river where most of the guns were directed, and at much shorter range than his camp, where, as stated in his report, "For about half an hour the fire was very hot, the shells falling everywhere from these headquarters to Westover." As evidence that the damage to the shipping must have been serious, on the following morning as the tide came in the whole face of the river was covered with floating wreckage. Thus ended one of the most interesting, as it was one of the most mysterious affairs of the war.

After the affair just related, we returned to Petersburg and thence to our former camp at Drewry's Bluff, when we were again employed in constructing fortifications and doing such picket duty as was required.

On August 14th, Maj. Gen. McClellan commenced very suddenly and hurriedly to abandon his camp at Harrison's Landing, and a few days thereafter the writer rode down the river and went through and took a general survey of the camp. I have never witnessed so great destruction of property as I saw then. Articles of clothing and blankets (all new) by the thousands, were piled in great heaps and apparently saturated with oil and fired. Great heaps of corn and oats in sacks were similarly treated and guns by the hundreds and various other articles of value were scattered over the camp, indicating that they must have left in a very great haste.

In the early part of the war it was persistently charged and as persistently denied, that the Federal troops used "steel breast-plates" for protection. I can not certify as to the truth of the charge, but will state that I saw a number of their breast-plates which were left in Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's camp.

We remained at and around Drewry's Bluff the balance of the year. In December we constructed comfortable log cabins in which to spend the winter. We completed them in time to move in just a few days before Christmas. We enjoyed a jolly Christmas and congratulated ourselves on being comfortably housed for the winter, but on the last day of December the brigade received "marching orders," and on January 1, 1863, we started for North Carolina and reached Goldsborough on January 3rd. We remained here until February 3rd, when we started on the march to Kinston in a very heavy snow storm. We reached Kinston on February 7th, and went into camp.

ATTACK ON NEW BERN.

A plan for a general and concerted movement along the coast region between Norfolk and Wilmington had been arranged for the early spring. A part of the plan was to make a simultaneous and combined attack on New Bern from three (3) points. Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew (NC) was to open the attack from the north side of the Neuse River and Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel (NC) with his brigade was to follow on the south side, while Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson (VA) moved down the Trent River, these last two (2) commands to attack from the land side and the rear of the city. The 43rd, 45th, and 50th NC Regiments of Brig. Gen. Daniel's Brigade left the camp near Kinston on the morning of March 12th, moving down on the south side of Neuse River, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill (NC) in person. Late in the after noon of March 13th, we encountered the enemy in considerable force of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and strongly fortified at "Deep Gully," a small stream a few miles west of New Bern.

Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel (NC) led the attack in person, and after a lively skirmish the enemy retired hastily and in much confusion. After thoroughly shelling the woods in front, we occupied their abandoned works for the night. During the night the enemy was reinforced by three (3) regiments of Massachusetts infantry, together with cavalry and artillery. At daybreak on the following morning we moved to the east side of the stream and took position in the following order: 45th NC Regiment in the center, 43rd NC Regiment to the right, and 50th NC Regiment to the left of the road. A strong skirmish line was immediately thrown forward by the 50th NC Regiment to feel for the enemy in the thick wood in our front. When they had advanced only a few paces in front of the main line they received a volley from the enemy, to which they promptly replied, and then followed a lively skirmish, our line slowly, but steadily, advancing all the while. The enemy resisted stubbornly, but were forced back on their main line. This our men were instructed to do, and then to slowly fall back in the hope that the enemy would follow and be drawn on our main line and thus bring on a regular engagement, but they remained behind their fortifications. While the 50th NC Regiment was thus engaged. Col. Thomas S. Kenan, with his 43rd NC Regiment, gallantly drove the enemy from his front on the right of the road. We were in suspense in the meantime, waiting for the sound of Brig. Gen. Pettigrew's guns on the north side of the river, which, by arrangement, was to be the signal for our advance to the attack of the city from the rear. Owing to the soft, miry character of the soil on the flat lands on the north side of the river, he found it impossible to move his guns near enough to be brought into action, and without these nothing could be accomplished, and he concluded to withdraw his line and this forced us to retire from our position, which we did the following day and returned to Kinston.

WASHINGTON, NC.

On March 25, 1863, the 50th NC Regiment left Kinston for Greenville, and on March 29th, crossed the Tar River, and joining Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett's (GA) Brigade moved on Washington, which we invested for sixteen (16) days. The regiment first took position with Brig. Gen. Garnett's Brigade on the east side, and near the town, but was afterwards ordered to meet a strong force of the enemy, which were reported to be advancing from Plymouth. We afterwards recrossed the Tar River and rejoined our old brigade (Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel's), which had been recalled from Virginia, at the Cross Roads near Washington, on the south side of the river. On April 9th, the 50th NC Regiment was sent by Brig. Gen. Daniel, at the request of Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew (NC) to aid him in the affair at Blount's Mill. After this we returned to our brigade at the Cross Roads, and on the night of April 14th the 50th NC Regiment moved down the "Grimes Road" and took position in a small clearing to the right of the woods a few hundred yards from the bridge at the town. We were exposed to heavy fire from the Federal guns, which had perfect range of the road for more than a mile. We were located by the small clearing which we occupied and were subjected to heavy fire from the combined batteries throughout the night, but having the protection of the timber in the intervening swamp, suffered very little.

On April 15th, the entire brigade took position near the river between the town and Rodman's Point. The 50th NC Regiment was sent across the low land and took position immediately on the bank of the river. In a short while our batteries at Hill's and Rodman's points opened a heavy fire, which lasted only for a short while. We supposed that the enemy's boats, which were constantly attempting to "run the blockade," had been driven back, as usual, but in a few minutes were taken completely by surprise when a small gunboat made its appearance in front of us and discovering our line drawn up on the bank of the river, greeted us with a succession of broad sides with grape and canister, until we "double-quicked" across the open ground and found cover behind a swamp. The garrison now being relieved by an ample supply of rations and ammunition, as well as reinforcement of fresh troops, the siege of Washington, which had lasted for sixteen days, was raised, and on April 16th our troops retired to Greenville.

The Federal commander, Maj. Gen. John G. Foster, in his official report, states that the ''Escort," which succeeded in running the gauntlet of our batteries, was struck forty (40) times by the guns at Hill's and Rodman's points, and that the pilot was killed by a rifle shot.

On May 1st, the brigade was ordered to Kinston, and on May 7th moved down near Core Creek, on the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad, and tore up several miles of the railroad track. Together with Colonel Nethercutt's Battalion, we made repeated incursions into the enemy's territory around New Bern, capturing a number of their pickets and scouts.

On June 17th, the brigade was again ordered to Virginia, and we reached the depot about midnight; but before we were all aboard our train an order was received for the 50th NC Regiment to return to their camp, and thus for the second time we were separated from our brigade, which we never rejoined.

On June 21st, we were ordered to Greenville and attached to Brig. Gen. James G. Martin's (NC) Brigade. We were engaged in constructing fortifications around the town and occasionally raiding the enemy's territory around Washington until July 3rd, when we returned to Kinston.

POTTER'S RAID.

On July 19, 1863, we received orders to intercept Federal Brig. Gen. Edward E. Potter, who was raiding the eastern counties from New Bern to Rocky Mount. This expedition, composed chiefly of the 3rd NY Cavalry and "North Carolina Union Troops," mostly negroes, left New Bern on July 18th and reached Street's Ferry on their return on July 22nd. They burned the bridges at Greenville, Tarborough, Rocky Mount; also the railroad bridge and trestle at this place, the Battle Cotton Factory, machine shops, engines and cars, storehouses, flour mills, a Confederate iron-clad gunboat, with two (2) other steamboats, all provisions they could find, and eight hundred (800) bales of cotton. Some of the above might be excused as being legitimate in time of war, but the conduct generally through the country traversed was wholly inexcusable, cowardly, and infamous in the extreme. Where they visited plantations they ordered the negroes to take the horses, wagons, buggies, and carriages and plunder their owner's houses, taking whatever they wished and join the procession.

Brig. Gen. Potter, in his official report, states that some three hundred (300) of these negroes reached New Bern with him. This is a very small proportion of the number we intercepted and captured at the "Burney Place," where Brig. Gen. Potter succeeded in flanking us and making his escape. Our object was to get between Potter and New Bern, cut off his retreat if possible, or at least harass and delay his return until reinforcements might reach us by way of Kinston and effect his capture. Unfortunately we had no cavalry except a small detachment of Lt. Colonel Kennedy's men. Col. Paul F. Faison, with the 56th NC Regiment, had been left to guard and hold Coward's Bridge. This left only the 50th NC Regiment and a portion of Lt. Colonel Whitford's Battalion to operate. The difficulty of contending with the movements of cavalry in an open country can be fully appreciated, especially as they kept constantly on the move all night. By destroying all the bridges and by rapid movement, without rest, sleep or anything to eat, we held them on the upper side of the creek for two (2) days and nights. After maneuvering all night of July 21st, crossing plantations and traveling unused country paths, they succeeded in escaping with the head of their column about daybreak on the morning of July 22nd. We succeeded, however, in reaching the point in time to intercept the rear of the column consisting mostly of negroes, traveling in every conceivable style. Brig. Gen. Potter, in his haste to escape, with his troops, abandoned his "contrabands," as he calls them, to their fate.

On reaching the "Burney Place" we opened fire on the column with a small brass cannon mounted on a saddle strapped to the back of a mule. This utterly demoralized the "contrabands" who, in their mad rush to keep pace with their erstwhile deliverers, but who were now fleeing for their lives, failed to discover us. The shock was so sudden and unexpected that the effect was indescribable. The great cavalcade, composed of men, women and children, perched on wagons, carts, buggies, carriages, and mounted on horses and mules, whipping, slashing and yelling like wild Indians, was suddenly halted by our fire upon the bridge. This fire was upon some negro troops who were in the rear of Brig. Gen. Potter's column. One negro captain, who was driving a pair of spirited iron-gray horses, attempted to rush past three (3) of our men who were lying in the yard and was shot dead as he stood up in the buggy firing at them as he drove past. Many others were either killed or wounded in attempting to escape through the woods nearby. In the excitement and confusion which ensued many of the vehicles were upset in attempting to turn around in the road and many others wrecked by the frightened horses dashing through the woods. We scoured the woods and gathered up several hundred negroes among the number several infants and a number of small children who had been abandoned to their fate.

About 8 o'clock we started in pursuit of Brig. Gen. Potter. For miles the road and woods on either side were strewn with all kinds of wearing apparel, tableware, such as fine china and silverware, blankets, fine bed quilts, and all sorts of ladies' wearing apparel which had been taken from the helpless, unprotected women at the plantations visited by the negroes, under Brig. Gen. Potter's orders. The reason these things were strewn indiscriminately along the road was that the few men of Lt. Colonel Kennedy's Cavalry and such as we were able to mount from time to time with the abandoned horses, kept up a running fight with the rear of the retreating column from the ''Burney Place" to Street's Ferry, causing many of the spirited carriage horses to become unmanageable and take to the woods, wrecking the vehicles and scattering their contents. I saw a number of instances where the carriages had been upset and the throats of the horses cut to prevent their falling into our hands. The 50th NC Reginient, with the exception of the few who had been mounted, performed the extraordinary feat of marching forty-eight (48) miles on this, 22nd day of July, 1863, reaching Street's Ferry about two (2) hours in the night, and this after having been in line or on the march continuously for two (2) days and nights without rest, sleep or rations.

When we reached the ferry that night there was perhaps not more than one fourth of our men in line. The writer had charge of the remnants of four (4) companies, but after a rest of about two (2) hours nearly every man and officer was in his place. About midnight some citizens of that section came into our camp and reported that Brig. Gen. Potter had communicated with New Bern and that a number of transports had reached the Ferry with heavy reinforcements, and that we were in very great danger of being captured. Acting upon the supposition that this report was true, we left our campfires brightly burning, and retiring in midnight darkness, marched the balance of the night, in the direction of Kinston, thus adding this to our previous record of forty-eight (48) miles, all within twenty-four (24) hours. We afterward learned that we had been deceived by "Buffaloes," and that the transports from New Bern did not reach Street's Ferry until late in the afternoon of the next day. Thus ended the "Potter Raid," one of the most infamous affairs that stain the record of our Civil War, and one which, I believe, has made every true soldier, who was forced to take part in it, blush with shame.

On August 9th, the regiment was ordered to Wilmington, and first went into camp at Virginia Creek and afterward at various places along the sound from there to Fort Fisher. On reaching camp on Topsail Sound, commissary supplies were brought down from Wilmington late at night, and rations were issued to the entire regiment early the next morning. All cooked and ate breakfast about the same time, and the entire regiment, men and officers, were poisoned by eating flour which had been poisoned and sent through the blockade. No deaths resulted directly, but the serious effects were felt for a long time and much sickness resulted. This was the second occurrence of the kind at Wilmington. We remained in and around Wilmington until the Spring of 1864, engaged in constructing fortifications, doing picket duty along the coast, and provost duty in the city. Nothing except an occasional shelling from some of the enemy's guns and watching our steamers successfully, and with a regularity almost equal to an up-to-date railroad schedule, run the so-called blockades, served to break the monotony of our every-day life.

On April 28, 1864, we received orders to proceed to Tarborough. On April 30th, we started on the march to Plymouth. The town had, after two (2) days of desperate fighting by the Confederate infantry, led by the gallant Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke (NC), assisted by Captain James W. Cooke, with the iron-clad boat "Albemarle," surrendered to the commander of the Confederate forces on April 20th.

A part of the 50th NC Regiment was stationed at Plymouth as a garrison for that place and the other part was sent to the town of Washington in charge of Lt. Col. John C. Van Hook for similar duty. The chief occupation of the regiment from this time to the latter part of October following, was raiding the eastern counties lying along the coast from New Bern to the Virginia line for the purpose of collecting and bringing out provisions from these productive counties for the use of our army in Virginia. This work was done by small detachments usually in charge of a Captain or a Lieutenant, but in many instances in charge only of a non-commissioned officer. The enemy being constantly on the lookout for these raiding parties, frequent encounters resulted. Recounting the many thrilling adventures covering this period, a whole volume might be written as a well-earned tribute to the private soldier, as many of the daring deeds were accomplished by them without the aid or direction of an officer. Many prisoners and much valuable property were brought in by these small detachments, and a remarkable fact is that they rarely ever lost a man. On one occasion a small party were scouting in the vicinity of Coinjock, where there was a ''lock" on the Albemarle & Chesapeake Canal, and noticing the manner of passing boats through this "lock," concluded that it afforded a splendid opportunity to capture one.

On returning to camp they reported to their officers the result of their observations and conclusions, and asked permission to make the attempt to carry them into effect. The officers seeming unwilling to assume the responsibility, they then asked for the assurance that they did not object to their assuming all the responsibility and undertaking the job. Having received this, they at once commenced to make the necessary preparation. Being their week "off duty" they at once proceeded to the place, and having detailed their plans to the "lock-keeper" and secured his co-operation, they concealed themselves nearby and awaited the arrival of the Government mail boat, plying between Norfolk and New Bern. The machinery for operating the "lock" very opportunely refused to work and the boat was unable to move in either direction, being fast upon the bottom. The squad made a sudden dash, and after firing a few shots the Captain surrendered his boat. They secured the United States mail pouches and such other valuables as they could carry, and then released the boat with all on board except Brig. Gen. Henry W. Wessells, who had shortly before surrendered Plymouth to Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke (NC), and who had been paroled and was on his way to be exchanged. He protested against his arrest and detention, but without avail, as the boys marched him back to Plymouth, the scene of his recent misfortune and humiliation. On another occasion a small party secured a boat, and crossing the sound, readied Roanoke Island at night and proceeded to the lighthouse, and after destroying the light, took the keeper and his wife prisoners. Hundreds of such deeds of daring and adventure might be recorded, but this sketch must necessarily be brief.

On October 23rd, the regiment was relieved and ordered to Tarborough, and on the night of October 27th, Lieutenant William B. Cushing, of the United States Navy, made his way up the river in a small steam launch, passed the pickets stationed on the wreck of the "Southfield," which was sunk by the Albemarle in the engagement of April 19-20, and making a sudden dash at the Albemarle, exploded a torpedo under her bottom, which caused her to sink at once, thus making it possible for the enemy to recapture Plymouth, which they did on October 31st. This feat of Lieutenant Cushing was one of the most daring and desperate on record, but one which might easily have been prevented if our pickets had been as watchful as they should have been. Several attempts had been made by this same officer to pass our pickets on the river while the 50th NC Regiment was in charge, but always failed, and several of his men were killed and captured in these attempts. The 50th NC Regiment would have remained at Plymouth but for the urgent appeal made by General Robert E. Lee to Governor Zebulon B. Vance and Lt. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes (NC) to garrison Plymouth and Washington with North Carolina Reserves, and send the 50th NC Regiment back to Virginia. But for this change it is almost certain that Plymouth would not have fallen into the hands of the enemy at the time and under the circumstances it did, thus cutting off the chief source of supplies for our army in Virginia. After the baggage had been loaded, and just as the regiment was ready to go in the cars, the news of the fall of Plymouth was received, order countermanded, and the regiment was, for the third time, prevented from returning to Virginia. We remained at Tarborough and Williamston for one month.

On November 24th, the 50th NC Regiment was ordered to Augusta, GA, reaching that place on November 27th, and on November 29th was ordered to Savannah. On reaching Charleston the next day a special train was in waiting, Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA) having telegraphed General Pierre G.T. Beauregard from Savannah to rush the regiment with all possible haste to Grahamville to meet Maj. Gen. John G. Foster, who was moving on the Charleston & Savannah Railroad near that point for the purpose of destroying the long trestle and thus cut off all communication with Savannah.

On the night of November 29th, Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith (GA) reached Savannah with a brigade of less than one thousand (1,000) Georgia militia. At this time there were no other troops in Savannah, Lt. Gen. Hardee had received information that Maj. Gen. Foster was moving in force on the Charleston & Savannah Railroad for the purpose of destroying the long trestle near Grahamville and thus cut off the only means of transporting troops and supplies to Savannah. Maj. Gen. Smith's militia were the only troops that could possibly reach the scene in time to check this advance and save the road, and he had received positive instructions from the Governor of Georgia not to carry the militia beyond the State line. He and Lt. Gen. Hardee hurriedly discussed the situation in all its bearings, and the conclusion was reached that the condition and circumstances justified disobeying the orders of the Governor, and the train which contained the troops was shifted to the Charleston & Savannah Railroad, reaching Hardeeville, SC at daybreak on November 30th.

They at once proceeded to Honey Hill, and passing a short distance beyond, discovered that the enemy in force had already reached and occupied the position which had been chosen by the Confederate commander prior to the arrival of the troops. This forced Maj. Gen. Smith to fall back and occupy a less desirable position. About 8:30 a.m. the enemy commenced his advance on this position and was greeted by a single shot from the only gun in position. Thus opened one of the most remarkable battles, in many respects, that was fought during the Civil War. The fighting was fierce and furious throughout the entire day, and ended only when the darkness of night made it possible for the enemy to retreat unobserved. Charge after charge during the first part of the day was repelled by this small band of Georgia militia, supported only by a South Carolina battery of five (5) light field pieces. During the morning the 47th GA Regiment arrived, but was held in reserve until ordered into action to check a flank movement of the enemy. The 32nd GA Regiment and the 50th NC Regiment, sent from Charleston, reached the field too late to participate. The Confederate forces present and engaged consisted of the Georgia militia (Senior and Junior Reserves), 1,000 strong, the 47th GA Regiment, and the South Carolina Battery, commanded by Colonel Gonzales, making a total of 1,400 in all.

The Federal forces engaged consisted of the 56th, 127th, 144th, and 157th NY Regiments; 44th MA (colored), and 55th MA; 102nd United States Colored Regiments; a brigade of Marines, a number of field batteries and several naval guns brought up from the gunboats in the river nearby.

The losses, as taken from the official reports, are as follows:

Confederate: Killed, 8; \vounded, 42; total, 50.

Federals: Killed, 88; wounded, 623; missing, 43; total, 754.

The 55th MA reports the loss of its Colonel and 100 men in five (5) minutes, and the 54th MA (colored), reports carrying 150 wounded from the field.

Considering all the circumstances, the character of the troops engaged, disparity in numbers, this fight perhaps has no parallel in history.

SAVANNAH.

On December 2nd, the regiment reached Savannah, and on December 3rd was ordered to the 45 Mile Station on the Georgia Central Railroad. The other troops were ordered back to the entrenchment at Savannah, leaving the 50th NC Regiment and a small squadron of Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's (AL) Cavalry alone to meet and contend with Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's column which was moving down the Georgia Central Railroad. The instructions were to harass and delay the column so as to gain time to strengthen our fortifications around the city as much as possible. On December 7th we commenced to skirmish with the vanguard, and on December 9th, having fallen back some distance to a strong position, the skirmishing became general and very heavy. The main body of the regiment had fortified a naturally strong position on the right of the road, and 1st Lt. Jesse T. Ellington, of Company C, was sent with a strong skirmish line to an open savanna on the left to protect that flank. The advance of the enemy was checked and the firing soon became extremely heavy at the point occupied by the regiment, but they stubbornly resisted the repeated attacks and held their position. After awhile there was a sudden lull in the firing on that side of the road which attracted Lt. Ellington's attention, and seeking a point where he could get a view of the breastworks discovered that they were occupied by the enemy in force. They had succeeded in flanking the position on the right, and thus forcing the regiment to hastily retire across a bridge which was held by some of Maj. Gen. Wheeler's men for this purpose.

Lt. Ellington had been instructed to hold his position until he received orders to withdraw, and now found himself entirely cut off, the enemy considerably to the rear of his position and a strong skirmish line deployed immediately in rear of his own line. He quietly faced his men about and commenced to move forward in regular order, and passing along the line whispered instructions to each man. Noticing a dense swamp some distance in front and to the right of the line of march, he had instructed the men to watch him and as they neared the swamp, at a given signal from him, to stoop as low as possible and run for the swamp. They had been moving all the while between the skirmish lines, the original one which was now in their rear and the new one which was thrown out after capturing our works, which was now in front. When they reached what seemed the most favorable position, the signal was given and promptly obeyed by every man. As they made the break it was discovered for the first time that they were Confederates, and fired upon. Three (3) of his men were shot dead, but all of the others, though fired at repeatedly, succeeded in reaching the swamp, which was quickly surrounded, but not a single one was captured. During the night they quietly left the swamp and attempted to make their way through the lines.

As the night was dark they were guided in their course by the guns at Fort McAllister, but after swimming the Ogeechee River and proceeding for some distance, the firing at the fort ceased and about the same time a battery of heavy guns opened in an entirely different direction, causing them to lose their course. This brought them again to the Ogeechee River, which they recrossed and after travelling all night, found themselves at daybreak next morning on the same ground they had left the evening before, and again in the rear of the enemy. They could make but little headway during the day but, the following night brought them near the lines of the two contending armies, which were now facing each other around and near the city. It was now daylight and the fighting was in progress all along the lines which, at this point, were only a short distance apart. Discovering a short and unoccupied space in the Federal line, they made a sudden dash, at the same time signaling to our troops not to fire. They were discovered and drew the combined fire from the right and left of the enemy's line, but reached our line safely.

On December 10th, Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman commenced the investment of the city of Savannah, and on December 13th the small garrison at Fort McAllister were forced to surrender. The enemy now controlled the river above and below, and the last means of escape for Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's (GA) army had been cut off. Maj. Gen. Sherman sent in a flag of truce and demanded an unconditional surrender of the city. The reply of Lt. Gen. Hardee, characteristic of the man and soldier, was: "I have plenty of guns, and men enough to man them, and if you ever take Savannah you will take it at the point of the bayonet." This was "bluff" in all of its perfection, as we then had not exceeding 5,000 regular troops all told, and were trying to gain time, hoping almost against hope, that some means of escape might be provided. The fighting continued day and night all along our lines, but no general assault was ever made. The fall of Fort McAllister enabled the Federal fleet to enter the river and thus establish Maj. Gen. Sherman's communication with the outside world. While Maj. Gen. Sherman was hesitating and wasting time over at Hilton Head arranging with Maj. Gen. John G. Foster for reinforcements of men and heavy guns with which to contend with our little army of about 5,000, while he already had more than ten to one (10-1), we were keeping up the fight all along the line and at the same time kept a detail working night and day constructing a pontoon bridge across the river. This was accomplished by collecting such small flat boats as could be found along the river and arranging them in line, using car wheels as anchors. The heavy timbers about the wharf were utilized as stringers from one boat to another, and then using planks from buildings, which were torn down for the purpose, as a flooring, by laying them across these.

The boats, being of various sizes and shapes and of unequal supporting power, made a very uneven surface, and the flooring being of a variety of lengths and thickness, still further increased a tendency to slide to the low places and otherwise get out of place, especially as it was entirely unsecured. In addition to the pontoon bridge, it was necessary to construct a long stretch of roadway across an impassable swamp and bog between the river and roads traversing the rice farms. This was done effectually by the liberal use of rice straw and sheaf rice which was secured in abundance at a nearby rice mill.

Extract from a communication of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant on December 16th:

''I think Hardee, in Savannah, has good artillerists, some 5,000 or 6,000 infantry, and it may be a mongrel mass of 8,000 to 10,000 militia and fragments."

Extract from Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's (GA) reply to Maj. Gen. Sherman's demand for the "unconditional surrender of the city" on December 17th:

"Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent forts is refused. With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraph of your letter, of what may be expected in case your demand is not complied with, I have to say that I have hitherto conducted the military operation intrusted to my direction in strict accordance with the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret the adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from them in future."

Extract from communication of Maj. Gen. Sherman to Lt. Gen. Grant on December 18th:

"'I wrote you at length by Colonel Babcock on the 16th instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and today received his answer refusing. * * * I should like very much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for the James River as soon as General Easton, who has gone to Port Royal for that purpose, reports to me that he has an appropriate number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force. * * * I do sincerely believe tliat the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina to devastate that State, in the manner we have done Georgia."

On December 19th, Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws (GA), in whose division the 50th NC Regiment belonged, received the following communication from Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA):

"General:—Lieutenant General Hardee directs me to say that the pontoon is completed, and he desires that you will see that your wagons containing cooking utensils and baggage are sent over and on to Hardeeville at daylight in the morning."

Respectfully, General,
Your obedient servant,
D. H. Pool,
Assistant Adjutant General.

About 10 o'clock on the night of December 19th, the writer received instruction to report at once to Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws (GA) at his headquarters at the Telfair House. On reaching there I was informed that all arrangements had been made for the withdrawal of our troops from the lines during the night, and received instructions to report promptly at 12 o'clock to take charge of the wagon train of our command, proceed at once to the city, break open the cars in which our baggage was stored and secure all important papers, etc., but not attempt to carry out any private baggage. Shortly after day of December 20th, this work had been accomplished and we commenced to cross the bridge. As we were the first to cross we succeeded without accident or the loss of a single team, but the other commands did not fare so well. The loose planks forming the floor were constantly slipping down to the low places, causing great gaps in the floor, at which the mules would take fright and shying to either side, would get on to the projecting planks and topple over into the river. Several teams were lost in this way. After we crossed the swamp and struck the road across the rice field we were in full view of the enemy, who had occupied the South Carolina side of the river for the purpose of cutting off our only line of retreat. Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler (AL) had been instructed by Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA) to keep this line open at any cost, and on the day before had been reinforced with troops and artillery for this purpose. A fierce fight was raging at the time between the two (2) contending forces, each bent on the possession of the road, which was of vital importance to us. We had a splendid view of the fight as we were passing over the long stretch of level and perfectly open rice field.

We reached Hardeeville, SC safely that evening, but spent a restless and anxious night. Orders had been issued and arrangements made for the army to cross the pontoon bridge early on the morning of December 20th, but in fact it did not cross until twenty-four (24) hours later. After the wagon trains had crossed over and the troops were ready to commence crossing, the bridge broke loose and swung down the river, necessitating a delay of a day and night before it could be replaced. The army crossed over safely on the morning of December 21st, and reached Hardeeville that day, where we had been for twenty-four (24) hours without hearing a word in explanation of the cause of the delay.

The official reports of December 20th showed "the effective strength of Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army" to be 60,598, not including the strong forces of Maj. Gen. John G. Foster at Port Royal, Hilton Head, and Coosawhatchie and a large fleet co-operating. And yet Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA), with his ''8,000 or 10,000 militia and fragments," as Maj. Gen. Sherman puts it, held this large and splendidly equipped army and fleet at bay for nearly two (2) weeks and withdrew unmolested and was well into South Carolina before it was even discovered that he had abandoned his line several miles beyond Savannah. Maj. Gen. Sherman, who was still at Port Poyal arranging with Maj. Gen. Foster for more troops and guns, did not reach the city until December 22nd, more than twenty-four (24) hours after Lt. Gen. Hardee had safely withdrawn his entire forces.

On December 26th, Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws' (GA) Division left Hardeeville for Pocotaligo, and on the march was compelled to diverge from the main road in order to avoid the fire from the batteries and gunboats near Coosawhatchie, as they had complete range of the road at this point. On reaching Pocotaligo the 50th NC Regiment occupied the extreme advance position at a small stream beyond "Old Pocatoligo." Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Baker (NC), who up to this time had commanded our brigade, was relieved from active duty on account of intense suffering caused by his wounded arm. He had the confidence, love, and esteem of every officer and man in the brigade, as did also the young men of his staff. The leave-taking was sad and affecting as they bid a final adieu to officers and privates alike. From this time the brigade was commanded by Col. Washington M. Hardy of the 60th NC Regiment.

On the second day after reaching Pocotaligo the writer, who was on duty on the advanced picket line, received a request from Col. Hardy to report at once to his headquarters. On arrival he was informed that Maj. Gen. McLaws had requested that he select and send to him for instructions, an officer who would undertake to enter Federal Maj. Gen. John G. Foster's lines that night for the purpose of ascertaining the exact location and approximate strength of his forces. After explaining his purposes and indicating just what information he desired, his final instructions were: "Go and never return until you can make this report."

I selected ten (10) men from my own company, and by night had completed all necessary arrangements. An old negro, who had spent his past life on the island below and was thoroughly acquainted with the country, and who had ''run away from the Yankees," and was now living near our camp, gave me a full description of the country and cheerfully consented to pilot me by a private foot path leading through a swamp to the peninsula formed by Tulifinny Creek and Coosawhatchie River upon which Maj. Gen. Foster's main forces were camped. The main road was strongly picketed right up to our lines, but by taking this byway through the swamps when we reached the open countiy we were well to the rear of the pickets. The old negro now pleaded piteously to be allowed to return to his home and his wife. He gave me an honest and truthful description of all the surroundings, after which I sent a man back with him to pass him through our line. The streams were full of gunboats and transports. In making a circuit of the camps we kept close to the water so as to avoid the pickets. We spent the entire night in making the circuit, counting camp fires, locating the troops and vessels, and returned safely, reaching our lines at daybreak next morning. I made a full report to the commanding officer, for which I and the men with me received his thanks.

On January 14, 1865, a sudden and undiscovered movement of the enemy from the island below, around our left flank, came very near cutting off the only line of retreat of the 50th NC Regiment and 10th NC Battalion at "Old Pocotaligo." There was considerable confusion and excitement for some time, as the enemy seemed to confront us in whatever direction we turned. We finally succeeded in finding a way out and by keeping up a running fight safely crossed the Salkehatchie River at River's Bridge. During the next few days the enemy concentrated a heavy force along the opposite side of the river between River's and Buford's bridges, and made repeated attempts to throw their pontoon bridge across the river and break through Maj. Gen. McLaws' line. The heavy rains had caused the river to overflow and the lowlands were flooded for miles in some places. This made it very difficult to reach a point from which the movements of the enemy on the opposite side could be observed. Between January 16th and 20th we had been forced to move back three (3) times to escape the flood.

SALKEHATCHIE.

On January 20, 1865, Company I, of the 50th NC Regiment, commanded by Capt. John B. Eaves, was ordered to move down to a high point of the river bank, which was ascertained to be not under water, for the purpose of watching and reporting movements of the enemy. Capt. Eaves received his orders from Col. Washington M. Hardy, commanding the North Carolina Brigade, and at the same time Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws (GA) had ordered Colonel Ficer, with his Georgia Brigade, to another point on the river for a like purpose. The river flats were heavily timbered and all under water, at the same time a dense fog prevailed. As a consequence of these conditions the troops lost their bearings and the two (2) commands met while wading in water waist deep, and each supposing the other to be the enemy who had succeeded in crossing the river, opened fire. The fight was kept up for about two (2) hours. Capt. Eaves reported to Col. Hardy, asking for reinforcements and a fresh supply of ammunition, as his was nearly exhausted. Colonel Ficer was reporting to Maj. Gen. McLaws and asking for help; each side was being reinforced as rapidly as possible.forced as rapidly as possible.

Capt. Eaves had lost several of his men, and 1st Lt. William M. Corbitt had taken one of their guns and was leading the men forward, firing from behind trees as they advanced. With his gun raised in the act of shooting he was himself shot dead by one of Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's (GA) men who happened to be with Colonel Ficer at the time. About this time Kinchen J. Carpenter and William Gaither Trout, of Capt. Eaves' company, had approached near enough to discover that Colonel Ficer's men were Confederates, and before the reinforcements called for had reached either side, this sad and distressing affair had ended. The loss in Colonel Ficer's command was considerable. When our dead and wounded were brought in and we learned the facts about this terrible mistake, there was sadness and weeping. The gallant young Lt. Corbitt was a general favorite in the regiment, the men always delighting to serve under him. While he was quiet, kind and tender as a woman, he did not know the meaning of the word fear when duty called him. He was brave, perhaps, it may be too brave. His remains were sent to his heart-broken, widowed mother in Rutherford County.

On January 30th, there was a general movement up the river, and on the night of February 1st, after marching until midnight, and just after halting and building campfires, the 50th NC Regiment was ordered to resume the march and proceed twelve (12) miles further up the river to Buford's Bridge. We reached the point at daybreak of February 2nd and proceeded at once to make all necessary preparation for the rapid burning of the bridge upon the first approach of the enemy, having been instructed to guard and keep it open as long as possible for the benefit of refugees from the opposite side of the river. Early on the morning of February 3rd heavy firing was heard from down the river, lasting for about two (2) hours, when it suddenly and entirely ceased. We concluded that the enemy, in attempting to effect the crossing on their pontoons, had been driven back and that they would now attempt to cross at Buford's Bridge. We advanced our picket lines beyond the river and anxiously awaited the approach of the enemy, as well as news from our troops below. The entire day passed and we neither saw nor heard from either. Between sunset and dark a young lad came riding into our camp with the news that Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws' lines had been broken and our entire forces driven back that morning.

He stated that Maj. Gen. McLaws started a courier with the information that we were entirely cut off from the command and to take care of ourselves the best we could, but that he was captured. This boy made his way through the lines and found us at this late hour. He was not a moment too soon, for as we hurriedly marched out on one side of the little village, the enemy's cavalry was entering the other side. We were favored by the dark night and a succession of unpassable swamps through which the single road had been constructed which made it possible, with a small force to guard the passes against cavalry. A lieutenant and about ten (10) men belonging to Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's (AL) command were with us doing courier and picket duty. When we commenced the retreat this officer told us to keep moving and he would guarantee to hold them in check and allow us to escape during the night. He was able to do this by taking advantage of the narrow ridges between the succession of swamps. On. reaching one of these he would dismount his men, and when the head of the column approached in the road, open fire. This would check their movement, as the character of the country was such that they could not leave the road. After remaining as long as he deemed it safe and expedient, he would mount his men and select another stand. The gallant young Tennesseean faithfully carried out his pledge to us, but at the cost of his own life, for at a late hour during the night, he was shot dead in the saddle and his horse overtook us on the road with rider lying upon his neck dead. He was taken off and buried beside the road some distance from where he received the fatal shot.

After marching all night and the next day, we struck the railroad at Bamburg. We found the station deserted, but the telegraph office was open and the instruments in place. We tried the wires to Charleston and found that the line had not yet been cut. Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA) informed us that the last train was expected over the road that night with the remnant of Lt. Gen. John B. Hood's (TX) army, and if it succeeded in reaching our station, to take possession of the train and run through to Charleston if possible. We had only a short while to wait, but instead of going through to Charleston, on reaching Branchville, we found our command, Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws' (GA) division, camped beside the railroad, and we dismounted and were once more at home, much to their surprise, as we had been reported and given up as lost.

We now made a stand and fortified our position on the Edisto River, bat as usual the enemy, with his overwhelming force of both infantry and cavalry, flanked our position, forcing us to retire. We moved by way of Ridgeville, and on February 25th the 50th NC Regiment and 10th NC Battalion, under Col. Washington M. Hardy, occupied Florence, where all the rolling stock of the railroad south had been collected, and also a large quantity of cotton stored. The other portion of Lt. Gen. Hardee's army was now concentrated at Cheraw, SC. Our brigade reached this place on March 3rd as it was being evacuated by Lt. Gen. Hardee, and just in time to cross the river. Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman writing to Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore in reference to the destruction of the vast amount of railroad rolling stock between Sumterville and Florence, uses the following language: "I don't feel disposed to be over-generous, and should not hesitate to burn Charleston, Savannah, and Wilmington, or either of them, if the garrison were needed. Those cars and locomotives should be destroyed, if to do it costs you 500 men."

This language, coupled with that used in his letter to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, written from Savannah on December 28, 1864, in which he expresses the desire "to have this army turned loose on the State of South Carolina to devastate that State as it has the State of Georgia," reveals the character of the man, and sufficiently accounts for the wanton destruction of property, devastation and ruin which followed in the wake of his army.

The history of this campaign, which ought to go down in history as a disgrace to the civilization of the American Nation, can be written in few words. The record of each day from first to last was but the repetition of the day before, when we could look back and see the homes of helpless women and children ascending in smoke, while they were turned out in the cold of mid-winter to starve and freeze. Since time has removed much of the bitterness which then existed between the two sections, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's friends have endeavored to defend his conduct and refute the charges made at the time, but the fact that the "record" is against him still remains.

On the part of the troops of Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's (GA) little army, the campaign through Georgia and South Carolina, embracing the entire winter of 1864-'65 was a severe and trying one, but there was no complaint or murmuring, and all seemed in the best of spirits. We were poorly clothed, and lightly fed, as we were compelled to subsist on the country through which we passed, and this was poorly supplied except with rice, until we reached the high-lands. Here the people were disposed to share the last mite with our soldiers. Whenever they were advised of our coming in time, the good women would have food in abundance prepared, and they would bring out large trays as we were passing, speaking words of comfort and cheer to us at the same time. Many of the men were entirely without shoes during January and February. This was owing to the fact that we were compelled to leave our baggage and supplies at Savannah for the lack of transportation, and we had been so situated since that none could reach us.

On March 3, 1865, we crossed the State line at Cheraw and were once more on the soil of our native State. We looked back in sadness at the desolation wrought in our sister State, and our hearts were overflowing with sympathy for the thousands of now homeless ones who had been so kind and generous to us. Now we must look forward to a like condition which was in store for our own people.

General Joseph E. Johnston, on March 6th, assumed command of all the forces in North Carolina. It was thought that Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman was heading for Charlotte, NC, and Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA) had instructions to watch his movements and keep in his front, while Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler (AL), Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton (SC), and Maj. Gen. Matthew C. Butler (SC) with the cavalry, harassed his flanks and rear to prevent "burning" and to be in position to promptly report any change of movement. While Lt. Gen. Hardee was on the march from Cheraw to Rockingham, NC, Maj. Gen. Sherman suddenly changed his course in the direction of Fayetteville, NC. General Johnston promptly informed Lt. Gen. Hardee, but the courier failed to deliver the message and in consequence we continued the march for a whole day in the opposite direction, reaching Rockingham, where we camped for the night. At this point the second dispatch was received from General Johnston and we immediately turned in the direction of Fayetteville and attempted, by forced march by day and by night, to regain the time lost. We reached Fayetteville and crossed the Cape Fear River before making a stand. The enemy occupied the town on March 11th and destroyed the old United States arsenal and burned the business portion of the town.

AVERASBOROUGH.

On March 15th, we occupied a position on the Averasborough Road, leading from Fayetteville to Smithfield and Raleigh, near Averasborough. As the enemy had retired from our front the day before, we were ordered to make ourselves comfortable and enjoy a day of rest. During the day we learned that the enemy were advancing in large force and driving our cavalry before them. A hurried disposition of the troops was made. Col. Alfred M. Rhett with his South Carolina Brigade, occupied the advance position where the Smith's Ferry Road intersects the Averasborough Road near Smith's house. Brig. Gen. Stephen Elliott's (SC) Brigade occupied a fortified position behind a swamp 200 yards to the rear and Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws' (GA) the main line of defense about 600 yards to the rear of the first line. As soon as proper disposition of the troops was completed, Col. Rhett was directed by Lt. Gen. Hardee in person to advance his skirmishers. They were soon heavily engaged by the enemy, and Col. Rhett venturing too far to the front, and mistaking a small party of the enemy for his own men, was taken prisoner. The command of this brigade now devolved upon Col. William Butler, of the 1st SC Infantry. Nothing more than a lively and prolonged skirmish developed during March 15th. At 7 o'clock on the morning of March 16th the enemy made a vigorous attack on our position with infantry and artillery. Their infantry made repeated attempts to carry our position, but were always repulsed with heavy loss. After about four hours' fighting, at 11 o'clock, they made a vigorous attack upon the left of the line, at the same time massing on and overlapping the right, forcing retirement on the second line occupied by Brig. Gen. Elliott. Repeated attacks were made on this line, but in each case they were gallantly repulsed.

About 1 o'clock they moved a heavy force in the direction of the Black River, completely flanking and exposing to a severe crossfire the left wing. This necessitated retirement on the main line held by Maj. Gen. McLaws. Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro (VA), with his force, which had been engaged up to this time, occupied position on both sides of the main road. Maj. Gen McLaws the left, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler (AL) with his dismounted cavalry, the right of the main line, Col. Alfred M. Rhett's (SC) Brigade, which had suffered so severely, was sent to the rear and held in reserve. Every attempt to carry this line was a complete failure and after night the enemy withdrew and commenced to fortify his position. We left our lines in possession of a picket of Maj. Gen. Wheeler's men and moved in direction of Smithfield. The Federal loss, as officially reported in this fight, was 682. The Confederate loss is not stated, but it was very heavy in Col. Rhett's Brigade.

It was now learned that Sherman's anny was crossing the Black River at several points. His persistent attempt to open the Averasborough Road seemed to indicate that his objective point was Raleigh, but this movement across the Black River made it uncertain as to whether he would move on Raleigh or Goldsborough, and Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA), in order to be in position to turn in either direction, moved to the intersection of the roads near Elevation Church, in Johnston County, reaching that point on the night of March 17th. At 12 o'clock on the night of March 17th, Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton (SC), who was at the front near Bentonville, received a request from General Joseph E. Johnston, who was then at Smithfield, about sixteen (16) miles away, for full information as to the location of the various commands of Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army, and his views as to the advisability of attacking the enemy. Lt. Gen. Hampton reported at once that the Fourteenth Corps was in his immediate front; the Twentieth Corps was on the same road, five or six (5-6) miles in the rear; while the two other Corps, Maj. Gen. John A. Logan's and Maj. Gen. Francis P. Blair's, were on a parallel road some miles to the south, and at the place where he was camped was an admirable one for the contemplated attack. He also reported that he would delay the enemy as much as possible to gain time for the concentration of his forces at this point. In a few hours he received a reply from General Johnston stating that he would move at once, and directing him to hold the position if possible. Early on the morning of March 18th, Lt. Gen. Hampton moved his cavalry forward until he met the enemy, and kept up a lively skirmish, slowly falling back, until in the afternoon he had reached the position previously selected for the battle. As it was of vital importance that this position should be held until the infantry could reach them, he dismounted his men and took the risk of sending his batteries to a commanding position far to the right of his line, and entirely unsupported, and made a bold and successful stand.

BENTONVILLE.

After personally superintending the placing of the guns and as he was mounting his horse to ride back to his line on the road, he overheard the following remark from one of the men at the guns, as he laughingly addressed his companions: "Old Hampton is playing a game of bluff, and if he don't mind Sherman will call him." General Joseph E. Johnston reached Bentonville during the night of March 18th with a portion of the troops from Smithfield. Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA), who had been informed of the plan of attack, left the camp at Elevation [Johnston County] early in the morning of March 18th, but after a hard day's march we camped that night at Snead's house, five (5) miles from Bentonville, and about eight (8) miles from the extreme part of the line of battle. We made an early start on the morning of March 19th, but had not reached the position assigned us before the enemy had made a bold assault on Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's (NC) position on the road. After a desperate struggle they were repulsed and driven from the field in confusion. At this critical moment a mistake occurred which perhaps entirely changed the results of the battle. Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton (SC) refers to it in his report of the battle, and General Johnston confirms his statements of facts and conclusion. I quote from "Johnston's narrative": "The enemy attacked Hoke's Division vigorously, especially its left, so vigorously that General Bragg apprehended that Hoke, although slightly entrenched, would be driven from his position. He therefore applied urgently for strong reinforcements. General Hardee, the head of whose column was then near, was directed, most injudiciously, to send his leading division, McLaws', to the assistance of the troops assailed."

Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton (SC) in his account of the battle, says: "Hoke repulsed the attack made on him fully and handsomely. Had Hardee been in the position originally assigned him at the time Hoke struck the enemy, and could his command and Stuart's have been thrown on the flanks of the Federal forces, I think that the Fourteenth Corps would have been driven back in disorder on the Twentieth, which was moving up to its support." Lt. Gen. Hampton, in his account of the part taken by Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee's (GA) command, quotes from General Joseph E. Johnston as follows:

"The Confederates passed over the hundred yards of space between the two lines in quick time and in excellent order, and the remaining distance in double-quick, without pausing to fire until their near approach had driven the enemy from the shelter of their entrenchments, in full retreat, to their second line. After firing a few rounds the Confederates again pressed forward, and when they were near the second entrenchment, how manned by both lines of Federal troops, Lieutenant General Hardee, after commanding the double-quick, led the charge, and with knightly gallantry, dashed over the enemy's breastworks on horseback in front of his men. Some distance in the rear there was a very thick wood of young pines, into which the Federal troops were pursued, and in which they rallied and renewed the fight. But the Confederates continued to advance, driving the enemy back slowly. Night coming on prevented the further advance of the Confederates who, elated with victory, were now anxious to continue the pursuit of the fleeing enemy."

The close of the first day of this hotly contested battle found the Confederates victorious at every point, not only holding their own lines, but at many points they rested for the flight in full possession of the fortified position of the enemy. About midday of March 20th the other two corps of the enemy which had been moving on the Fayetteville and Goldsborough Road, crossed to the Averasborough Road and appeared in full force on our left, which was entirely unprotected from Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's (NC) position on the road to Mill Creek below. This necessitated changing Maj. Gen. Hoke's front to left and parallel to the road. Maj. Gen. LaFayette McLaws' (GA) Division was now shifted to Maj. Gen. Hoke's left, with the 50th NC Regiment and 10th NC Battalion-Heavy Artillery forming the extreme left of our line. This left considerable space between our left and Mill Creek, thus exposing the left wing, which was overlapped. This was occupied only by a very thin skirmish line of our cavalry.

These newly-arrived forces assaulted our line from Maj. Gen. Hoke's right to Maj. Gen. McLaws' left repeatedly during the afternoon of March 20th, but were handsomely repulsed in every instance. On the morning of March 21st the fighting was resumed along Maj. Gen. Hoke's and Maj. Gen. McLaws' front. As there was no demonstration on our right, Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro (SC) threw forward a skirmish line in his front and ascertained that the Federal left had been withdrawn, and the combined attacks were directed against the center occupied by Maj. Gen. Hoke and the left by Maj. Gen. McLaws and our cavalry. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon our left being hard pressed and overlapped, Brig. Gen. Taliaferro was ordered from the extreme right to our support. About the same time it was learned that the Federal Seventeenth Corps had succeeded in breaking through the thin skirmish line on our left and was in rear of our line and near the only bridge which spanned Mill Creek at Bentonville. Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee (GA) was moving Brig. Gen. Alfred Cumming's Georgia Brigade to the left to protect this gap at the time, and discovering the enemy, ordered Col. Robert J. Henderson, commanding the brigade, to attack the head of the column, at the same time discovering the 8th TX Cavalry approaching, he ordered them to charge the left flank, he leading the charge in person.

Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton (SC) at the same time struck the right flank with Brig. Gen. William H. Young's (GA) Brigade, commanded by Col. Gilbert J. Wright, while Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler (AL) attacked the rear of the Federal column some distance away. The rout of the enemy was complete and they were soon driven back beyond our lines. As they retreated in confusion the slaughter was terrible. Our losses in the affair were insignificant as to number. A son of Lt. Gen. Hardee, a youth of only 16 years, who had arrived only two (2) hours before, was killed while riding in the charge of the 8th TX Cavalry, led by his father. The firing, which had been extremely heavy up to this time, ceased upon the return of the Seventeenth Corps to its position in line, and there was no other attempt made to carry any part of our line. Lt. Gen. Hampton states that the Confederate forces engaged in this affair did not exceed three hundred (300). While Maj. Gen. McLaws held the extreme left of our lines and the enemy were endeavoring to turn our flank the 50th NC Regiment and 10th NC Battalion-Heavy Artillery of Col. Washington M. Hardy's Brigade, in a single charge and in about five (5) minutes time sustained a loss of about one-third of their number.

In this case the enemy were lying in line three (3) columns deep and reserved their fire until our troops were near them struggling through a dense swamp. At the first volley every man fell to the ground and Col. George Wortham and 2nd Lt. William Lane, of the 50th NC Regiment, and 2nd Lt. Charles S. Powell, of the 10th NC Battalion-Heavy Artillery, crawled out of the thicket and reported to Maj. Gen. McLaws for duty, stating that the entire brigade was killed or wounded. Col. Washington M. Hardy, by his boldness and daring, saved the command from utter destruction. Dressed in a suit of sky blue broadcloth and broad-brimmed slouch hat, he might easily be taken for a Federal ofticer. He was in front of his men leading the charge, and at the first volley he rushed forward with his hat in one hand and his sword in the other, and pacing up and down in front of and within a few feet of the Federal lines, ordered them to cease firing, as they were firing on their own men. He continued this for some time, although their own officers were ordering them to fire. They were utterly confused and before the firing was resumed all of our men who were able had crawled out of the swamp and made their escape, and Col. Hardy deliberately walked off without a scratch.

On the night of March 21st the enemy kept up a heavy picket fire along our front while withdrawing their troops in the direction of Goldsborough. At midnight our troops were withdrawn and crossing the creek at Bentonville, moved on March 22nd toward Smithfield. In the battle four (4) companies of the 50th NC Regiment, Company C and Company D of Johnston County, Company E of Wayne County, and Company H of Harnett County, were near their homes and many of the men, who had not seen their homes and families for many months, marched by them and tarried for only a few minutes, went into the fight, the guns of which could be distinctly heard by their loved ones, and again without stopping, marched by these same homes with General Joseph E. Johnston's army on its final retreat, proving their faith and loyalty to the "Lost Cause" to the last.

The 50th NC Regiment before leaving this State for Georgia in November of 1864, was recruited from the camp of instruction at Raleigh to something over 900, and now mustered less than half that number, the others being lost from various causes during the severe and trying campaign through which they had passed.

The Confederate forces in this battle were about 17,000 infantry, the Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler and Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton Cavalry and a few light field batteries, while Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army, as officially reported a few days after the battle, numbered more than 81,000.

The Federal reports place their losses at 1,646 and that of the Confederates at 2,606, but General Joseph E. Johnston in his account of this battle, places the Federal loss at more than 4,000. Our army moved to Smithfield and thence to a point a few miles north of the present town of Selma and went into camp to await Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's next move, whether by way of Raleigh or the more direct route by Weldon. The men of our command were supplied with clothing, not having had a change since leaving their baggage in Savannah on December 20, 1864, nor had they slept under shelter since leaving Tarborough in November preceding. At the reorganization of General Johnston's army the 50th NC Regiment and 10th NC Battalion were assigned to Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland's (NC) Brigade, Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's (NC) Division, and what had constituted Baker's and Hardy's Brigade was disbanded.

RETREAT AND SURRENDER.

On April 10th, we received information that Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman had commenced to move his troops from Goldsborough in the direction of Raleigh. Our army commenced to fall back and on April 11th we camped a few miles cast of the city of Raleigh on the present site of the town of Garner, entering the city early on the morning' of March 12th. Our rear guard left Raleigh that night and a day or two later we heard the news of General Robert E. Lee's surrender. On April 18, 1865, at the Bennett House, four (4) miles west of Durham, a conference was held between General Joseph E. Johnston and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, and terms of capitulation agreed on and signed. These terms were more favorable to us, even, than were accorded to General Robert E. Lee by Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox, Court House in Virginia.

Upon reaching Washington, President Abraham Lincoln having been assassinated in the meantime, they were rejected and General Johnston being so informed, was again on the defensive. We resumed the march, passing through Chapel Hill and halting at a point near Greensborough where the final terms were agreed upon April 26th. The army was paroled on May 2-3, 1865.

In crossing the Haw River several of our men were drowned by leaving the ford to reach some fish traps a short distance below and being caught by the swift current and swept down into the deep water below. On reaching Alamance Creek, we had a novel, and in some respects, amusing experience. On account of heavy rains the stream was much swollen and the current very strong. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham's (TN) command was moving in front of Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke's Division and on attempting to ford the stream several men were swept down by the current, whereupon the others absolutely refused to move. This halted the entire column, and as the enemy's cavalry was closely pressing our rear, the situation was becoming critical. Maj. Gen. Cheatham rode to the front and learning the cause of the halt, ordered the men to go forward, but, emphasizing their determination with some pretty lively swearing, they doggedly refused to move, whereupon Maj. Gen. Cheatham seized the nearest man and into the stream they went.

After floundering in the water awhile he came out and, after repeating the process for a few times, the men raised a shout and proceeded to cross. Three (3) wagons, one loaded with "hardtack," one with guns, and one with bacon, capsized and were swept down the river. Some lively diving for the bacon followed, but I guess the guns are still rusting in the bottom of the creek. I am sure none of them were disturbed on that occasion. Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke (NC), becoming restless and impatient at the delay, adopted a means of transportation which proved at least the resources of a fertile brain. The water was just running over the sandy banks of the stream and selecting a suitable place a short distance above the ford, he moved the head of his column to this point, directed one man to seize his horse's tail, and another to grasp this man's shoulder, and another and another until he had a long line, swam his horse across the narrow stream and discharging his cargo safely on the opposite bank, would quickly return for another. The rapidity with which the men were carried over was astonishing. I don't know what the final result might have been had we not received information that a short distance up the stream at Ruffin's Mill was a broad and shallow ford below the mill, at which we could easily and safely cross.

Following the announcement of the second "armistice" were several days of anxious waiting. There was a very large element of both officers and men who were opposed to a surrender and many were leaving in small bands with the understanding that they would afterwards meet at some rallying point to be agreed upon.

When the final announcement was made that the army was to be surrendered, the scenes were pathetic; strong, brave men were seen to weep like children. Officers everywhere were delivering farewell addresses to the brave men who had so faithfully and loyally followed their leaders and endured hardships and privations without a murmur.

If General Robert E. Lee had been able to hold out until his army and General Joseph E. Johnston's could have been united as had been agreed upon, and both hurled against Federal Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and then against Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, the result might have been quite different. Would it have been for the best interest of our country and our race? While no true Confederate soldier has any apology to offer for his course, there is a wide diversity of opinion as to the correct answer to the above question.

THE ROSTER.

Roster of officers of the 50th NC Regiment given in the order of succession as shown by dates of commission:

Colonels: Marshall D. Craton, James A. Washington, George Wortham.
Lieutenant Colonels: James A. Washington, George Wortham, John C. Van Hook.
Majors: George Wortham, John C. Van Hook, Henry J. Ryals.
Adjutants: William H. Borden, Jesse W. Edmondson.
Surgeons: Walter Duffy, Francis W. Potter, John D. Patton.
Assistant Surgeons: Francis W. Potter, John D. Patton, Spencer Eaves, I.F. Norman.
Quartermasters: Edwin B. Borden, Edward W. Adams.
Commissary: Edward S. Parker.
Chaplains: Dr. Robert S. Moran, Thomas B. Haughton.
Sergeant Majors: Jesse W. Edmondson, John A. Green, Council B. Wright.

CAPTAINS.

Company A—Person County-—John C. Van Hook, James A. Burch.
Company B—Robeson County—E. C. Atkinson.
Company C—Johnston County—Robert D. Lunsford, Thomas R. Youngblood.
Company D—Johnston County—Henry J. Ryals, William B. Best.
Company E—Wayne County—John B. Griswold, Philip L. Burwell, William T. Gardner.
Company F—Moore County—James O. A. Kelly.
Company G—Bntherford County—George W. Andrews.
Company H—Harnett County—Joseph H. Atkinson.
Company I—Rutherford County—John B. Eaves.
Company K—Rutherford County—Samuel Wilkins, George B. Ford.

FIRST LIEUTENANTS.

Company A—James A. Burch, William A. Blalock.
Company B—Atlas Atkinson.
Company C—Thomas R. Youngblood, Jesse T. Ellington.
Company D—William B. Best, Joseph J. Penny.
Company E—William T. Gardner, William H. Borden.
Company F—Alexander Bolin.
Company G—Asbury H. Nabors, John A. Morrison.
Company H—John P. McLean, Benjamin F. Brantly.
Company I—William M. Corbett. Samuel E. Bostick.
Company K—George B. Ford, James A. Miller.

SECOND AND THIRD LIEUTENANTS.

Company A—William A. Blalock, Robert D. Ramsey, Albert O'Briant, Allen H. Lunsford.
Company B—Randall P. Collins, William P. Walters, William B. Jenkins.
Company C—George W. Watson, William Lane, Joseph C. Ellington, Ransom H. Yelvington (Ensign).
Company D—William B. Best, William M. Adams, Young J. Lee, Joseph J. Penny.
Company E—William H. Borden, George C. Griswold, William L. Edwards, George T. Jones.
Company F—Malcolm McF. Watson, James Dalrymple.
Company G—John P. Flack, Reuben F, Logan, Samuel D. Hampton, Thomas J. Long,
Company H—John Brantly, David S. Byrd, Benjamin F. Brantly, Anthony L. Parker, Franklin M. Roberts.
Company I—Samuel E. Bostick, Carter Burnett, Andrew J. Eaves, Jesse Hillard, Francis Moore.
Company K—Pinkney B. Ford, Joseph L. Hampton, Joseph H. Harris, James A. Miller, Hiram Mitchell, Lewis P. Wilkins.

The writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Kinchen J. Carpenter, of Company I, for the use of a diary kept by him and still preserved. This was found to be exceedingly valuable in fixing dates not otherwise obtainable.

All "historical events" treated in the foregoing sketch were verified by a careful search of "The Official Records of United States and Confederate Armies" and may be relied on as strictly authentic.

J.C. ELLINGTON,

Raleigh, NC
26 April, 1901